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RECENT DECISIONS
,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES-POLICE POWER-INDIGENT MIGRANTs.-Appel-
lant, a citizen of the United States and a resident of California, was
convicted of violating the California anti-migrant law for having trans-
ported his jobless brother-in-law, a citizen of the United States and
a resident of Texas, into the State of California. The statute pro-
vided that "Every person, * * * that brings or assists in bringing into
the state any indigent person who is not a resident of the state, know-
ing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." I
Held, conviction reversed. Such a statute penalizing the bringing in-
to the state any indigent non-resident, even in cases of persons who
are presently destitute of property and without resources to obtain
the necessities of life, is an unconstitutional barrier to interstate com-
merce, and not a valid exercise of the police-power of the state. While
Mr. justice Byrnes, writing for the majority of the court, placed his
decision on the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas, joined by Mr. justice Black and Mr. Justice Murphy,
concurred on the ground that the "right" of freedom of movement is
an incident of national citizenship protected against state interference
by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Mr. Justice Jackson, who also based his opinion upon the
privileges and immunities clause, was of the view that "indigence"
does not warrant restricting the freedom of a citizen, as does crime
or contagion. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164
(1941).
Notwithstanding a line of reiterated Supreme Court dicta to the
effect that a state in the exercise of its police power may exclude ac-
tual paupers and others likely to become public charges,2 one enter-
tains no doubt that the decision under consideration is a sound one.
The opinion tolled the death knell of the Elizabethan notion that
"poor law" administration is a matter of local concern, 3 and placed
the problem within those subjects embraced in the commerce clause
that are of such a nature as to demand that if regulated at all, their
regulation must be prescribed by a single co-ordinating authority.4
Since commerce among the states consists of intercourse and traffic
1 CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE (Deering 1937) § 2615.2 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 625 (U. S. 1842) ; City of New
York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102 (U. S. 1837). (Decided prior to the broadening of
the concept "commerce" as employed in the commerce clause.) The court
stated that City of New York v. Miln, supra, is disapproved in so far as it
intimates that a state may exclude persons on the ground that they are paupers.
3 In the United States, the various types of legislation stem from the
Elizabethan poor law of 1601. 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SoCLAL SCIENCzS
230, 233. For exhaustive treatment of the English statutes enacted to cope
with the problem of unemployment and pauperism, see 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAw 387 et seq.
4 See Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346, 351,
59 Sup. Ct 528 (1939); 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed.
1927) 1274 et seq.
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between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons as
well as property,5 whether the transportation is commercial in char-
acter or not,8 statutes aimed at the removal or exclusion of indigent
migrants are clearly within the scope of the commerce clause.7  De-
priving a person of freedom of movement is a deprivation of "liberty"
within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Among
the rights and privileges of national citizenship recognized by the
courts, is the right to pass freely from state to state.9 In the past,
removal and exclusion statutes have been upheld by state courts on
the ground that indigents, because of their dependence on public
funds, constitute a special class, and are therefore subject to public
control.' Hence, it seems that the issue logically narrows down to
whether "indigency" constitutes a basis for restricting the privileges
and immunities of a citizen," and if so, may a state in the exercise
of its police power remove or exclude such indigents? Even though
the majority opinion was based upon the commerce clause it, too,judging from the result, would appear to answer both queries in the
negative. As to the opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Jackson, there is no doubt that the answer is in the negative.' 2
5 United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143 (1919) ; Hoke andEconomides v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1917).6 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct 192 (1917).
7 For the possible constitutional objections, see Note, Interstate Migration
and Personal Liberty (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 1032; Note, Depression Migrants
and the States (1940) 53 HARV. L. REv. 1031; Bowman, The United States
Citizen's Privilege (of) State Residence (1930) 10 B. U. L. REV. 459.
8 See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct 7 (1915) (State cannot
deny to an alien admitted into the country by the Federal Government, the
privilege to enter any state of the Union and reside therein); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct 427 (1897).
9 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct 14 (1908) ; Cran-
dall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1867) ; United States v. Moore, 129 Fed. 630,
633 (C. C. A. 5th, 1904).
20 See note 2, supra; Mr. Justice Finch, dissenting in Matter of Rosario
Chirillo, 283 N. Y. 417, 436, 28 N. E. (2d) 895 (1940).
The exclusion or removal contemplated in this discussion is from one state
into another state. Statutes permitting removal from one county or "settle-
ment" into another within the state, when applied to proper cases, have not been
deemed an interference with personal liberty "without due process of law".
Lovell v. Seeback, 45 Minn. 465, 48 N. W. 23 (1891).
11 The Articles of Confederation expressly excepted "paupers, vagabonds,
and fugitives from justice", from those inhabitants of each state entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states. United
States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 294, 296, 41 Sup. Ct. 133 (1920). "The word,[Pauperism] strictly speaking, applies not to temporary destitution, not at all
to 'honest poverty', buf to chronic willing dependency". 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMMCANA 423. As used in "poor laws", indigents, poor persons, and paupers,
include those persons who are destitute and in need of relief. 48 C. J. 428;
22 AM. AND ENGL. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW (2d) 947; Polk County v. Owen,
187 Iowa 220, 239, 174 N. W. 99 (1919).
12 "'Indigence' in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for
denying them. * ** -constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed or color".
Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160,
184-185, 62 Sup. Ct 164 (1941).
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The problem herein involved was dearly one of extreme national
importance, and a statute whereby a state seeks to "isolate itself from
difficulties common to all of them" is definitely diametrically opposed
to national unity. To employ the phraseology of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
"It (the Federal Constitution) was framed upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in
the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." 13
E. D. R.
CRIMINAL LAw-EvIDENCE-CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICE
AS TO MATTERS CONNECTING DEFENDANT WITH THE CRimE.-The
defendant is charged with the murder of one Shuman, whose body was
found in a stolen automobile in the Borough of Brooklyn. The de-
fendant and the deceased were members of that borough's group of
criminals known as "Murder, Inc.". The deceased was believed to
have been conveying certain secret information to a member of the
Detective Bureau and for that reason the members of the "corpora-
tion" desired to have him killed. The accused was chosen as the
person to do the killing, and by a ruse the decedent was enticed into
the automobile and was shot. Among three accomplices there was
one by the name of Reles who testified on behalf of the State that
the defendant was the murderer. To corroborate the accomplice,
non-accomplice witnesses testified that the decedent did have certain
conversations with a member of the police force; that the automobile
in which the decedent was found was stolen from the non-accomplice
witness; that a policeman was on duty at all times at the place of
killing first planned; that the accomplice, Reles, was present at the
apartment of one, Lepke, about whom the decedent was telling the
police. At the trial, the court was requested to charge that the evi-
dence by the non-accomplice witnesses was insufficient to corroborate
the accomplice. The court so charged and added that the evidence
did not tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the
crime but was intended to corroborate the witness as to whether or
not he was "telling the truth as to credibility." To this, counsel took
objection and the court again charged that the evidence did not tend
to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime but it
did "tend to show, or prove or disprove, the credibility of a witness."
Held, judgment of conviction reversed and a new trial ordered. The
People of the State of New York v. Irving Nitzberg, 287 N. Y. 183,
38 N. E. (2d) 490 (1941).
There has always been a natural distrust of the testimony of an
accomplice to a crime. Prior to the enactment of Section 399 of the
13 Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 523, 55 Sup. Ct. 497 (1935).
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